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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 32 
Rule 32. Use of depositions in court proceedings. 
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an 
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible 
under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present 
and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented 
at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accor-
dance with any of the following provisions: 
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contra-
dicting or impeaching the testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for 
any other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the 
deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person desig-
nated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or 
private corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency 
which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by 
any party for any purpose if the court finds: 
(A) that the witness is dead; or 
(B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from 
the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it 
appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party 
offering the deposition; or 
(C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, 
illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or 
(D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to pro-
cure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 
(E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circum-
stances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and 
with- due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of 
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. 
(4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an 
adverse party may require him to introduce any other part which ought 
in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may 
introduce any other parts. 
Substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 25 does not affect the right to use 
depositions previously taken; and when an action has been brought in any 
court of the United States or of any state and another action involving the 
same subject matter is afterward brought between the same parties or their 
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfiilly taken and 
duly filed in the former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken 
therefor. A deposition previously taken may also be used as permitted by the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(b) Objections to admissibility. Subject to the provisions of Rule 28(b) 
and Subdivision (d)(3) [(c)(3)] of this rule, objection may be made at the trial or 
hearing to receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason 
which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then 
present and testifying. 
(c) Effect of errors and irregularities. 
(1) As to notice. All errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a 
deposition are waived unless written objection is promptly served upon 
the party giving the notice. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 32 
(2) As to disqualification of officer. Objection to taking a deposition 
because of disqualification of the officer before whom it is to be taken is 
waived unless made before the taking of the deposition begins or as soon 
thereafter as the disqualification becomes known or could be discovered 
with reasonable diligence. 
(3) As to taking of deposition. 
(A) Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency, 
relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to 
make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the 
ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or 
removed if presented at that time. 
(B) Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in 
the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or 
answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and 
errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if 
promptly presented are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is 
made at the taking of the deposition. 
(C) Objections to the form of written questions submitted under 
Rule 31 are waived unless served in writing upon the party pro-
pounding them within the time allowed for serving the succeeding 
cross or other questions and within 5 days after service of the last 
questions authorized. 
(4) As to completion and return of deposition. Errors and irregu-
larities in the manner in which the testimony is transcribed or the deposi-
tion is prepared, signed, certified, sealed, endorsed, transmitted, filed, or 
otherwise dealt with by the officer under Rules 30 and 31 are waived 
unless a motion to suppress the deposition or some part thereof is made 
with reasonable promptness after such defect is, or with due diligence 
might have been, ascertained. 
(d) Publication of deposition. Use of a deposition under Subsection (a) of 
this rule shall have the effect of publishing the deposition unless the court 
orders otherwise in response to objections. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction for this appeal is conferred upon this 
Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment in 
favor of Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC"), dismissing Plaintiff 
Guy Barco Zewadski's ("Zewadski'') Complaint for Rescission of 
Contract, Recovery of Damages, Deceit, Fraud and Plaintiff's 
First Amended Complaint for Rescission of Contract, recovery of 
damages, deceit, fraud and unconscionability? Inasmuch as a 
challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of 
law only, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusion. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d, 497, 499 (Utah 
1989) . 
2. Did the district court properly grant FMCC summary 
judgment on its counterclaim against Zewadski for amounts due 
pursuant to the Lease, attorney's fees for litigation expenses in 
these proceedings, cost of suit, and post-judgment interest? The 
appellate court reviews the district court's conclusions for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusion. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d, 497, 499 (Utah 
1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action brought by Zewadski involves an alleged 
rescission of contract and claims for deceit, fraud, and alleged 
unconscionability of contract. Zewadski leased a 1988 Ford 
Merkur (the "Vehicle") from Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury ("Rick 
Warner"). The lease (the "Lease") was assigned to FMCC. (R. at 
244.) Zewadski filed this action, clciiming that, contrary to 
alleged representations by Rick Warner, the Vehicle was defective 
because it slid on snow and ice. (R. at 2-19.) On that basis, 
and sometime prior to filing his Complaint in April 1989, 
Zewadski ceased making payments on the Lease, and allowed the car 
to be repossessed and sold by FMCC. (R. at 252-254.) Based upon 
Zewadski's default under the terms of the Lease, FMCC 
counterclaimed against Zewadski for amounts due under the Lease 
after sale of the Vehicle and for attorney's fees and other costs 
incurred in this litigation. (R. at 26-27.) 
On January 2, 1990, the court granted FMCC summary judgment, 
dismissing Zewadski's claims in his Complaint and First Amended 
Complaint against FMCC. (R. at 228-231, Addendum A.) On 
August 30, 1991, the district court denied Zewadski's Motion for 
Leave to Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint. 
(R. at 500, Addendum B.) On September 20, 1991, the district 
court granted FMCC summary judgment on its counterclaim, awarding 
FMCC its claim for damages, attorney's fees and all costs related 
to this suit. (R. at 573-575, Addendum C.) In that summary 
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judgment, the district court determined that the undisputed facts 
revealed that all events had occurred which entitled FMCC to 
recover a judgment from Zewadski pursuant to the terms of the 
Lease with Zewadski. (R. at 574.) The district court also 
determined that the Lease was a true lease. (R. at 574.) 
Finally, the district court provided Zewadski with the 
opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of FMCC's stated 
attorney's fees. (R. at 575.) 
Thereafter, Zewadski filed an Objection to Form of Summary 
Judgment Order dated September 20, 1991 and filed various motions 
to strike the affidavits for attorney's fees of FMCC's counsel. 
(R. at 586, 590.) Zewadski also filed a Motion for a New Trial 
(R. at 594-595) and an Affidavit for Disqualification of Judge 
Pat B. Brian from the case. (R. at 648-651.) 
Zewadski's Affidavit for Disqualification of Judge Brian was 
denied by District Court Judge Michael R. Murphy. (R. at 675.) 
Also, Zewadski's Objection to Form of Summary Judgment Order 
dated September 20, 1991 on FMCC's counterclaims, Motion for a 
New Trial, and Motion to Strike the Affidavits of FMCC's counsel 
were all denied. (R. at 679-680.) 
Zewadski appeals the January 2, 1990 and the September 20, 
1991 orders granting summary judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 6, 19 89, Zewadski entered into a Lease with Rick 
Warner for the lease of the Vehicle. (R. at 135.) The Lease was 
duly executed by Zewadski (Depo. of Zewadski at p. 67, R. at 
135.) On January 6, 1989, the Lease was assigned to FMCC. (R. 
at 244.) 
Rick Warner did not make any representation to Zewadski that 
the Vehicle wais equipped with all-season tires. (Depo. of 
Zewadski at pp. 70-72, R. at 135.) The only information on which 
Zewadski relied that all-season tires were equipment of the 1988 
Ford Merkur XR4Ti was a Reno, Nevada newspaper advertisement from 
a dealership other than Rick Warner, which obviously related to a 
vehicle other than the one Mr. Zewadski leased. (Depo. of 
Zewadski at p. 70, R. at 135.) 
By letter dated February 24, 1989, from Zewadski to FMCC and 
Rick Warner, Zewadski purported to rescind the Lease. (Depo. Ex. 
No. 2, R. at 244.) By letter dated March 3, 19 89, from Zewadski 
to FMCC, Zewadski again purported to rescind the Lease. (Depo. 
Ex. No. 3, R. at 244.) On March 9, 19 89, Zewadski voluntarily 
surrendered the Vehicle to FMCC and failed to abide by the 
voluntary early termination provisions of the contract (Depo. of 
Zewadski at pp. 57-58, Depo. Ex. No. 4, R. at 244.) 
On April 3, 1989, Zewadski filed his First Amended Complaint 
for Rescission of the contract, recovery of damages, deceit and 
fraud. Zewadski alleged that the Vehicle did not drive well in 
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snowy conditions, contrary to the representations of Rick Warner. 
(R. at 244-245.) [Zewadski made other assertions that he did not 
pursue in the trial court and has not argued on appeal.] 
FMCC conducted a sale of the Vehicle, recovering $10,400.00, 
which, along with other amount;- •. . *-wadski was entitled, 
were properly credited to Zewadski's account. The sale left a 
deficiency amount of $5,692.44 as of August 28, 1989 under the 
terms of the Lease. (R. at 245.) FMCC incurred total expenses 
of $10,654.90 in attorney's fees, court costs and other expenses 
to enforce FMCC's rights under the Lease, not i ncludi ng costs and 
fees in this appeal. (R. at 504-506.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
The trial court's granting of summary judgment to FMCC, 
denying the claims of Zewadski's Complaint and First Amended 
Complaint against FMCC, was proper and should be affirmed. The 
undisputed facts in this case, particularly ,..---wadski' s 
admissions in his deposition (which deposition was properly used 
by FMCC, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure), establish that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC made any 
representation that the Vehicle would not slide on snow or ice. 
Zewadski's deposition revealed that he obtained that information 
from a Reno, Nevada newspaper advertisement by a dealership other 
than Rick Warner, and related to a vehicle other than the one he 
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leased. The district court correctly reasoned that if no such 
representations were made by the defendants, then defendants 
neither defrauded Zewadski nor did they unconscionably disclaim 
any warranties to which Mr. Zewadski was entitled. 
POINT II 
The district court properly considered and denied all issues 
of warranties and alleged unconscionability in this case, because 
the Vehicle never failed to perform other than as represented or 
warranted. Zewadski mistakenly argues that summary judgment was 
wrongfully granted to FMCC, because certain warranties under the 
Lease were improperly disclaimed. In actuality, the district 
court disregarded Zewadski's claims of improper disclaimers and 
unconscionability pursuant to a denial of Zewadski's Motion to 
Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint, which 
raised those claims. Because it had already been determined that 
the undisputed facts revealed no credible showing that the 
Vehicle had failed to perform within standards represented by 
Rick Warner, the district court reasonably refused to permit 
Zewadski to supplement his Complaint or First Amended Complaint 
with those issues. 
Further, neither Rick Warner nor FMCC have ever argued that 
they disclaimed any warranties, which they were not entitled to 
disclaim under federal or state law. Instead, FMCC's argument is 
simply that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC ever warranted that the 
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Vehicle would n-t: slide on snow or ice. Therefore, Zewadski's 
appellate arguments regarding representations or warranties were 
properly decided by the district court, and his appeal on those 
issues shoul d t> • denied. 
POINT III 
The district court properly granted FMCC summary judgment on 
its counterclaim for amounts d/i le i mder the Lease, including 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs for this litigation, because 
the undisputed facts established Zewadski's default, the amount 
of damages, and the absence of defenses asserted by Zewadski. 
Further, despite Zewadski's claims in his appellate brief to the 
contrary, FMCC submitted appropriate evidence estab] ishing its 
entitlement to summary judgment, which evidence verified that all 
events had occurred in order for FMCC to properly exercise its 
rights under the "Default" section of the Lease, and thereby 
collect amounts due and owing, including attorney's fees and 
costs incurred for this litigation. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court has held that extensive quotations from numerous 
case authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot substitute 
for the development of appellate arguments explicitly tied to the 
record. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Zewadski's brief is a confusing discussion 
of his view of the law of contracts, tied together with extensive 
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quotations from case authorities, treatises and statutes, but 
lacking any application of the law to the facts of this case. In 
short, Zewadski fails to identify the windmills at which he is 
tilting. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED FMCC'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ZEWADSKI'S 
CLAIMS . 
Mr. Zewadski's Complaint and First Amended Complaint accuse 
defendants Rick Warner and FMCC of deceit and fraud, claiming 
that the defendants represented that the Vehicle would not slide 
on snow or ice, but that the car in fact did so. (R. at 3-4, and 
10-11.) Part of Mr. Zewadski's argument was that Rick Warner 
allegedly represented that the tires that came with the vehicle 
were all-season tires. 
The problem with Mr. Zewadski's entire argument is that Mr. 
Zewadski admitted, in his deposition, that Rick Warner did not 
make any representation that the Vehicle was equipped with all-
season tires or that it would not slide in snowy conditions.1 
JZewadski's repeated assertion in his brief that FMCC did 
not submit evidence in support of its Motions for Summary 
Judgment opposing Zewadski fails. FMCC relied upon Zewadski's 
deposition, which FMCC correctly referenced in its lower court 
pleadings, pursuant to Rule 32. (See e.g., R. at 135-136, 244-
245.) Zewadski made no timely objection to FMCC's use of 
Zewadski's deposition, pursuant to Rule 32, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Indeed, even Zewadski used the deposition pursuant to 
Rule 32, to which FMCC offered no timely objection. (Seef e.g., 
R. at 145.) FMCC also relied upon affidavits by FMCC employee, 
Nancy Rollins, in support of its Motions for Summary Judgment. 
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Zewadski's deposition further revealed that lie obtained that 
informati ' l Reno, Nevada newspaper advertisement by a 
dealership other than Rick Warner relating to a vehicle other 
than the one he leased. Ik, Jt 135•13 6. )2 
Q Now, isn't it true, Mr. Zewadski, that the only 
place that you learned that all-season tires was part 
of a purchase was from the Reno advertisement? 
A That's correct. The Reno newspaper advertisement 
mentioned that it was equipped with all-season radial 
tires, and I was under the impression that when I 
showed that advertisement to Vic Field [a Rick Warner 
official] that--which I showed him the advertisement 
from the Reno paper to Vic Field, and when I inquired 
about the tires and the driveability in the snow, even 
though they didn't answer me directly that it had all-
season tires, they didn't tell me that it didn't. And 
they indicated--Paul Smith [a Rick Warner official] 
(R. at 252-55; and 459-61.) 
Despite the claims in Zewadski's brief that FMCC was 
required to publish Zewadski's deposition, all of the cases w ;xh 
Zewadski cited are outdated and have been overruled by t* 
drafting of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 32(d) which became 
effective January 1, 1987. This Court has even recently held 
that subdivision (d) of Rule 32, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
now makes "publication" of a deposition unnecessary. Salt Lake 
City Corp v. James Construction, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) . 
2Mr. Zewadski's brief refers, at times, to numerous 
affidavits which he submitted to the district court in support of 
his many motions, objections, etc. Ford Motor Credit Company is 
uncertain what point Zewadski intends to support by these 
references to these affidavits. However, in Gaw v. State, 798 
P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court stated that a party 
may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that contradicts his 
deposition to create an issue of fact on a motion for summary 
judgment, unless the deposition was in error or the party-
deponent is able to explain the contradiction in his affidavit. 
See also, Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) . 
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indicated that it would drive fine in the snow with the 
story that he related to me.3 
Q You acknowledged earlier today that in the 
advertisement that you reviewed on behalf of Rick 
Warner Ford, that there was no mention of the type of 
tire. 
A No, no mention of the tire in Rick Warner's 
advertisement. . . . (Depo. of Zewadski, pp. 70-71; R. 
at 135.) 
The above text reveals, as did other testimony, that neither 
Rick Warner nor FMCC made the kind of representations to Zewadski 
that Zewadski claims were made. Thus, the district court 
correctly reasoned that if no such representations were made by 
either defendant, then defendants could not, under any circum-
stances, have defrauded Zewadski nor could they have unconscion-
ably disclaimed any warranties to which Mr. Zewadski was 
entitled. 
Even in light of the undisputed facts and the extensive 
district court review of those facts as applied to the law, 
Zewadski has relentlessly reiterated claims of alleged warranty 
or service contract problems allegedly caused by defendants. It 
is evident from the record that Mr. Zewadski's contentions are 
based, not on the undisputed facts, but upon his own legal 
conclusions quite apart from the facts in this case. A portion 
3The "story" to which Mr. Zewadski referred, was later 
explained in his deposition as follows: " . . . what he [Paul 
Smith] did was tell me, apparently, an evasive story about a 
client that had traded in a Lincoln Mark VII that drove in the 
snow all the time and said it was the best car he'd ever had." 
(Depo. Zewadski p. 78.) 
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of the transcript of the proceedings cf -he district court from, 
August 30, 1991, is illustiat i - . •: \:v. .onfusion that Zewadski 
has had on the issues. 
The Court: The court will ask you this question 
another time, and require that you give a specific 
response. Is there any contention by the Plaintiff 
that there is a service warranty in issue in this Ccise? 
Mr. Zewadski: Your honor, the only thing at issue is a 
contract. 
The Court: Did you understand the question? Please 
read the question back, Mr. Reporter (the question was 
read back by the court reporter). 
Mr. Zewadski: I am not familiar with there being any 
service warranty whatsoever in this case, your honor. 
There is a service contract , (R. at 710.) 
The Court: Was there ever any allegation by the 
Plaintiff that Rick Warner failed to repair the 
vehicle. 
Mr. Zewadski: No, your honor. 
The Court: Then why is a service warranty in issue? 
Mr. Zewadski: Because it is invalid, your honor. 
The Court: Whether it even exists is immaterial if it 
is not in issue. 
Mr. Zewadski: I believe it makes the contract an 
enforceable and unconscionable contract. 
The Court: Anything further? Both sides submit? (R. 
at 711.) 
Mr. Zewadski conceded in open court that there was no 
failure by the dealer to repair the vehicle. The court correctly 
held, based upon the undisputed facts and admissions by Zewadski 
himself, "that there was no credible evidence showing that the 
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Vehicle failed to perform within acceptable standards." (R. at 
229.) Because the undisputed facts reveal that neither Rick 
Warner nor FMCC ever represented that the Vehicle would not slide 
on snow or ice, and there is no credible evidence that the 
Vehicle failed to perform within acceptable standards, Zewadski's 
claims below and on appeal are mere legal conclusions based upon 
Zewadski's opinion, and should be dismissed accordingly. 
POINT II 
ALL ISSUES OF WARRANTIES WERE PROPERLY 
CONSIDERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND WERE 
DENIED, BECAUSE THE VEHICLE NEVER FAILED TO 
PERFORM OTHER THAN AS REPRESENTED OR 
WARRANTED. 
Zewadski argues on appeal that summary judgment was wrong-
fully granted to FMCC, because certain warranties under the Lease 
were improperly disclaimed. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-17.) 
Because of the improper disclaimers, Zewadski argues the entire 
lease contract is unconscionable and the Lease is void. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 40.) 
Actually, Zewadski is mistaken regarding the district court 
procedure. The district court's decision to disregard issues of 
improper disclaimers or unconscionability were based, not on a 
summary judgment decision, but on the court's denial of 
Zewadski's Motion to Supplement his Complaint and First Amended 
Complaint. That motion, which first raised the wrongful 
disclaimer and unconscionability issues, was denied by the court 
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on August 30, 1991, and the court's discussion on the denial ol 
that motion is instructive for the present appeal. 
Regarding Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement hi s 
Complaint and First Amended Complaint, the court has 
heard extensive oral argument by Zewadski lasting 
approximately 40-45 minutes as to why the court should 
grant Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement his 
Complaint and First Amended Complaint with new evidence 
allegedly relating to the existence of warranties on 
the subject vehicle of this lawsuit. The court finds 
that Zewadski offered no new factual or legal arguments 
beyond those which have been voluminously briefed and 
argued at length in a prior hearing on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and upon which the court issued an 
order in FMCC's favor dated January 2, 1991, stating 
that no material issues of fact or law remain as to any 
fraud allegedly perpetrated by Rick Warner or as to any 
warranty issues relevant to this case. On that basis, 
Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement his Complaint 
and First Amended Complaint is denied. (R. at 500-
501.) 
The district court's ruling on a motion to amend is within the 
discretion of the trial court, and that absent a clear abuse of 
that discretion, the appellate court will not disti irb a trial 
court's ruling on a motion to amend. Kelly v. Utah Power & 
Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The district court clearly determined that the undisputed 
facts in this case reveal no credible showing that the Vehicle 
failed to perform within the standards represented by Rick 
Warner. On that basis, the court reasonably refused to permit 
Zewadski to supplement his Complaint or First Amended Complaint 
with those issues. 
Further, neither Rick Warner nor FMCC have at any time 
argued that they were entitled to or did disclaim any warranties, 
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express or implied, which they were not entitled to disclaim 
under federal or state law. FMCC's argument is, and has always 
been, simply that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC ever warranted 
that the Vehicle would not slide on snow or ice. Because the 
undisputed facts establish that neither Rick Warner nor FMCC 
warranted that the Vehicle would perform in any way other than 
how it performed, all of Zewadski's appellate arguments regarding 
representations or warranty issues, which comprise most of his 
brief, were properly decided by the court, and his appeal on 
those issues should be denied. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED FMCC 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST 
ZEWADSKI FOR AMOUNTS DUE UNDER THE LEASE AND 
FOR EXPENSES INCURRED. 
The Lease states, at paragraph 24, as follows: 
Default: If the lessee fails to make any payment under 
this lease when it is due, or if the lessee fails to 
keep any other agreement in this lease, the lessor may 
terminaite this lease and take back the vehicle. . . . 
Even if the lessor retakes the vehicle, the lessee must 
still pay at once the sum of (a) the difference, if 
any, between the adjusted balance subject to lease 
charges . . . and that amount received by Ford Credit 
upon the sale of the vehicle at wholesale and (b) all 
other amounts then due under the lease. The lessee 
must also pay expenses paid by the lessor to enforce 
the lessor's rights under the lease, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees as permitted by law, and 
damages caused to lessor because of the lessee's 
default. The lessor may sell the vehicle at public or 
private sale with or without notice to the lessee. 
(R. at 246-247.) 
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The undisputed facts in this case reveal that Zewadski :.:rr-.rted 
to rescind the lease by two letters riat <-jd Pebi LMJ y - -
March 3, 198 244.). On March 9, 1 989, Zewadski volun-
tarily surrendered the Vehicle to FMCC and failed to abide by tIn-
voluntary early termination provisions . >£ the contract (R. at 
244). The affidavit of FMCC employee Nancy Rollins proves that 
after Zewadski surrendered the Vehicle to FMCC( FMCC sol"; tin 
Vehicle at an auction for $10,400.00. (R. at 252-55.) After 
subtracting credits to which Zewadski was entitled, the sales 
proceeds were immediately applied to Zewadski's debt due and 
owing to FMCC, leaving a remaining obligation of $5,692.44. (R. 
at 254.) Zewadski has not made payments on the lease since 
surrendering the Vehicle to FMCC. (R. at 254.) 
Based upon the foregoing information, the district court 
went to extreme lengths, at numerous hearings, to give Zewadski 
an opportunity to fully and fairly state any cause of action 
which he may legitimately have had and which may afford him a 
defense to FMCC's counterclaim. An excerpt from the transcript 
of the proceedings of September 20, 1991 :i llustrates the extent 
to which the district court went to accommodate and understand 
Zewadski's claims and defenses. 
The Court: As a courtesy to the pro se Plaintiff, the 
Court has extended privileges in this lawsuit which 
would not be extended if you were represented by 
counsel. And the Court has stated repeatedly on the 
record that, in an effort to be fair in every aspect of 
this litigation, the Court has extended pleading privi-
leges and argument privileges and other privileges that 
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relate to the rules of the Court, simply because you 
are pro se. Those privileges would not have been 
extended to you were you not represented by counsel. 
The Court has gone the extra mile repeatedly to under-
stand the basis of your lawsuit, to give you ample 
opportunity to argue it, and to plead it, and to rule 
upon it. The Court did consider your proposed amended 
answer. The Court found that, legally and factually, 
it was inappropriate, denied your motion to amend your 
answer, and the Court so ruled in our August hearing. 
And the Court so rules this morning. . . . (R. at 700-
701.) 
As to the specific issues raised in FMCC's Summary Judgment 
Motion on its Counterclaim against Zewadski, and the issues 
Zewadski raised in opposition to FMCC, and which the district 
court heard and ruled upon, and which issues Zewadski now brings 
again before this Court, the same tramscript from September 20, 
1991 reflects that District Court Judge Brian correctly stated as 
follows: 
The Court: The Court finds as follows: the contextual 
agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and the 
lessor was, in fact, a legal lease. It was not a 
security agreement. 
The Court further finds that, consistent with the 
Plaintiff's own acknowledgment, there has never been, 
from the date the vehicle was delivered to the 
Plaintiff until the date it was returned to the lessor, 
an assertion by the Plaintiff that mechanical problems, 
electrical problems, suspension problems, or any other 
defective problem existed with the vehicle which was 
the subject of the lease. 
The Court further finds that the sale of the vehicle by 
the defendant was commercially reasonable, that it was 
conducted appropriately to obtain the maximum money 
from the subject vehicle. 
The Court further finds that the allegations by the 
Plaintiff relating to the service contract are neither 
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factually nor legally persuasive. Service has never 
been an issue in the lawsuit before the court. 
The Court further finds that for whatever reasons, the 
lessee developed lessee remorse. The lease was valid 
on its face, it was enforceable, and the returning of 
the leased vehicle by the lessee after 60 days and 
4,000 miles had intervened, did not exonerate the 
lessee of his responsibilities, pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of the lease. 
The Court finds that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact, relating to the dispute. Therefore, as 
a matter of law, the defendant is entitled to Summary 
Judgment and the relief prayed for is granted 
(R. at 692-693.) 
The transcript reflects that the district court meticulously 
and competently reviewed any possible claim which Zewadski may 
have had in defense of FMCC's counterclaim. The court correctly 
held that all events had occurred which entitle FMCC to summary 
judgment on its counterclaim, as a matter of law. (See also, R. 
at 574.) Zewadski has failed to even challenge this, let alone 
to successfully argue in his brief that there is any evidence to 
support a reversal of the district court's decision in this FMCC 
is entitled to expenses which it incurred in this lawsuit and in 
pursuing Zewadski for amounts owed under the Lease. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed fact, particularly proved by Zewadski's own 
acknowledgments, is that neither Rick Warner Ford nor FMCC repre-
sented that the Vehicle would not slide when driven on snow and 
ice. Therefore, any and all claims, issues, or defenses that 
Zewadski now argues regarding deceit, fraud, service contracts, 
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unconscionability of contract, disclaimers of warranties, whether 
implied or expressed, and any other such issues, are merely 
Zewadski's own legal conclusions, not supported by any facts. 
The trial court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of 
FMCC and its decision denying Zewadski's claims against 
defendants should be affirmed, and the matter should be remanded 
for an award of FMCC's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this •>* day of August, 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
R. Wilson Kim 
Thomas F. Taylor 
Attorneys for Appellee Ford 
Motor Credit Company 
tft\895S.252\Appeal.Brf 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Thomas F. 
Taylor of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for Appellee, 
Ford Motor Credit Company, hereby certifies that on the 3rd day 
of August, 1992, he caused to be served upon Guy B. Zewadski, by 
first class mail, postage prepaid, four copies of Brief of 
Appellee Ford Motor Company. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Thjomas F. Taylor 
Attorneys for Appellee Ford 
Motor Credit Company 
Tab A 
' / < 3 / < 7 ! 
KIM R. WILSON 
SNOW# CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ford Motor Credit Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY 
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Civil No. 89-0901423CN 
Counterplaintiff, Judge Pat B. Brian 
vs. 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Counterdefendant. 
Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the First Amended Complaint came on for hearing, 
pursuant to notice, before the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on December 14, 1990, at 8:30 
a.m. and Ford Motor Credit Company being represented by Kim R. 
Wilson, and plaintiff being present and appearing on his own 
behalf, and the Court having reviewed the files and records 
herein, including the motion, affidavits and extensive memoranda 
of the parties in support and opposition to the motion, and 
having heard argument of the parties, and it appearing from the 
record (1) that statements of Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury or its 
employees were not false, fraudulent nor material 
misrepresentations or omissions relating to capabilities of the 
vehicle; (2) that all warranties, if any, as to merchantability 
or fitness for purpose were excluded; (3) that there is no 
credible showing that the vehicle failed to perform within 
acceptable standards; (4) that there was no misrepresentation or 
omission regarding income tax issues; (5) that there was no 
alteration of the lease contract; (6) that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact; (7) and that Ford Motor Credit 
Company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing 
therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Ford Motor Credit Company1s Motion for Summary Judgment 
be, and the same hereby is, granted. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint for Recision of Contract, Recovery 
of Damages, Deceit, Fraud, and Plaintiff's First Amended 
Complaint For Recision of Contract, Recovery of Damages, Deceit, 
-2-
Fraud, be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
3. Costs and attorney's fees are awarded to Ford Motor 
Credit Company in an amount to be determined in further 
proceedings. 
4. Ford Motor Credit Company's Counterclaim against 
plaintiff be, and the same hereby is, unaffected by this order 
and remains pending. 
DATED this v day of December, 199CH 
BY THE COURT: 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
09\bjd\08958.252\surrmary.jtjd 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Harvi Lynn Chiles, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Ford Motor Credit Compciny herein; that she served 
the attached [PROPOSED] SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Case Number 89-
0901423CN, in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a 
true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Brian C. Harrison 
Harris, Carter & Harrison 
3325 North University Avenue #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Guy B. Zewadski Guy B. Zewadski 
P. 0. Box 1232 ^ 512 Merritt Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 Oakland, CA 94610 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 1 /a" day of December, 1990. 
i i • . _ ,. .. 
Harvi Lynn~Chi3.es 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I n day of 
December, 1990 
QT3&K5 Qttr/vxvr-
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
mg in the state of Utah 
TabB 
KIM R. WILSON (A3512) 
THOMAS F. TAYLOR (A5804) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Counter-Plaintiff FMCC 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY and 
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY, 
Defendants. 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY 
Counter-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Counter-Defendant. 
On August 2, 1991, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing was held before 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Court Judge, on the 
following pleadings: 
1. Plaintiff Zewadski's Order to Show Cause; 
f:^B5STRfCTS3URT 
Third judicial District 
AUG 3 0 1991 
Otputy Clerk 
ORDER 
Civil NO. 89-0901423CN 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
2. Plaintiff Zewadskifs Motion to Strike the hearing on 
FMCC's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3. Plaintiff Zewadskirs Motion for Leave to Supplement 
Zewadskifs Complaint and First Amended Complaint; 
4. Plaintiff Zewadski!s Motion to Reconsider Order and 
Vacate Summary Judgment; and 
5. Counter-claimant Ford Motor Credit Company's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Ford Motor Credit Company ("FMCC") was represented by counsel of 
record, Thomas F. Taylor, and Guy Barco Zewadski ("Zewadski") 
appeared pro se. The Court, having considered the arguments of 
the parties at length, and good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Zewadskifs Order to Show Cause was not warranted in 
fact or law, was not brought or interposed for a proper purpose, 
and was not filed in good faith. Therefore, Zedawskifs Order to 
Show Cause is hereby stricken. The Court further finds that the 
Order to Show Cause was filed to harass and cause delay in 
violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Accordingly, the Court finds Zewadski in contempt and sanctions 
Zewadski in the sum of $200 to be paid to the Court no later than 
August 9, 1991 at 12:00 noon. In addition, the Court awards to 
FMCC its reasonable legal fees and costs of $160.00 which is 
supported by an affidavit dated August 5, 1991, and which was 
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incurred by FMCC in its defense of the Order to Show Cause, which 
award shall be set forth by separate order. 
2. Regarding Zewadski's Motion to Strike the Hearing on 
FMCCfs Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon Zewadski's 
contention that FMCC did not file a Notice to Submit for 
Decision, the Court denies Zewadski's Motion, and finds that FMCC 
had properly filed a Notice of Hearing with the Court on July 9, 
1991, that Zewadski had been properly served with that Notice on 
July 9, 1991, and that Zewadski conceded to the Court that he was 
in no way prejudiced after having received that Notice of 
Hearing. 
3. Regarding Zewadski's Motion for Leave to Supplement his 
Complaint and First Amended Complaint, the Court heard extensive 
oral argument by Zewadski lasting approximately 40-45 minutes as 
to why the Court should grant Zewadski's Motion for Leave to 
Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint with new 
evidence allegedly relating to the existence of warranties on the 
subject vehicle in this lawsuit. The Court finds that Zewadski 
offered no new factual or legal arguments beyond those which had 
been voluminously briefed and argued at length in a prior hearing 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, and upon which the Court issued 
an Order in FMCC's favor dated January 2, 1991, stating that no 
material issues of fact or law remained as to amy fraud allegedly 
perpetrated by Rick Warner Ford or as to any warranty issues 
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relevant to this case. On that basis,. Zewadskifs Motion for 
Leave to Supplement his Complaint and First Amended Complaint is 
denied. 
4. For the same grounds stated in paragraph 3 of this 
Order, the Court denies Zewadski's Motion for the Court to 
reconsider its January 2, 1991 Order and to vacate that Summary 
Judgment. 
5. The Court, taking extraordinary steps to give Zewadski 
the benefit of explaining and arguing all his claims, grants 
Zewadski an additional ten (10) days to supplement his response 
to FMCCfs Motion for Summary Judgment on FMCCfs counterclaim. 
Zewadski must complete and file said supplemental response by 
August 12, 1991 at 12:00 noon. 
6. The Court, taking extraordinary steps to allow Zewadski 
a full and fair opportunity to be heard on FMCC's Counterclaim 
against him for a deficiency and for attorneys1 fees under the 
terms of the subject contract, continues the hearing date for 
FMCCTs Motion for Summary Judgment on FMCC's Counterclaim until 
August 30, 1991, at 8:30 a.m. 
DATED this 2?Q day of August, 1991. 





AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Angie White, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by 
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Counter-Plaintiff, Ford Motor Credit Company herein; that she 
served the attached ORDER (Case Number 89-0901423CN, Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
envelope addressed to: 
Brian C. Harrison, Esq. 
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
3325 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, UT 84604 
Guy B. Zewadski 
P.O. Box 1232 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
3& on the day of August, 1991. 
L.<L- iLui^. 
Angie Wl; 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me tkis c V ^ - day of August, 
1991 
My Commission Expires: 
the State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC i 
STEFANIEJ. OYXES ' 
or T xp i r r -s \K " ^ -
QO& 
^ . ^ I 8 9 «- STATE OF UTAH 
TabC 
KIM R. WILSON [A3512] 
THOMAS F. TAYLOR [A5804] 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Ford Motor credit Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY 
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 
Counterplaintiff, 
v. 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Counterdefendant. 
Defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company's ("FMCC"), Motion for 
summary Judgment on its Counterclaim came on for hearing, 
pursuant to Notice, before the above-entitled Court, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on September 20, 1991, at 
Civil NO. 89-0901423CN 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
9:30 a.m., and FMCC being represented by Thomas F. Taylor, and 
Plaintiff being present and appearing on his own behalf, and the 
Court having reviewed the files and records herein, including the 
Motion, Affidavits and extensive Memoranda of the parties in 
support of and in opposition to the Motion, and having heard the 
argument of the parties, and it appearing from the record (1) 
that any and all other pending motions, objections and other 
pleadings had been reviewed and heard by the Court, (2) that 
there is no remaining issue as to any material fact in this case, 
including but not limited to, such issues regarding service 
contracts or warranties, (3) that all events have occurred which 
entitle FMCC to recover a judgment from Plaintiff pursuant to the 
terms of the Lease, which is the subject of this case, (4) that 
the Lease, which is the subject of this lawsuit, is a true lease, 
and (5) that FMCC is entitled to judgment on its Counterclaim 
against Plaintiff as a matter of law, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it 
is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Objection to Form of the Order 
prepared by FMCC dated y ^ £) Q - , 1991, is hereby 
denied. 
2. FMCCfs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
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3. FMCC is hereby granted judgment in the amount of 
$5,692.44 plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and 
after August 28, 1989 to the date hereof. 
4. FMCC is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$9,267.50 for all litigation expenses in these proceedings. 
5. FMCC is awarded costs of suit, and post-judgment 
interest on the whole award at the rate of 10% per annum. 
APPROVED this £ Q day of September, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
•^U- g^ -^ -
003Ytft\8958.252\sunjgord.pld 
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